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Abstract 
This study analyzes the changes in the institutional contexts of family offices in four major 
European economies. Drawing on institutional theory and considering capitalist varieties, it uses 
a qualitative content analysis of the newspaper coverage in the UK, Switzerland, Germany, and 
France from 2000 to 2018. The findings reveal significant changes in the regulatory environment 
in most countries, few changes in the normative dimension, and an increase in critical articles over 
time. They add to the literature on institutional change in and across countries by identifying new 
types of drivers of change in the context of family offices.  
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1. Introduction 
Most family businesses rely on various types of advisors (Kaslow, 2006; Naldi, Chirico, 
Kellermanns, & Campopiano, 2015). Among these, family offices act as a mechanism for the 
control of entrepreneurial families as well as their businesses and wealth. They help preserve the 
families’ objectives, fortunes and values as a legacy for future generations and support families in 
their entrepreneurial investments and new venture creation (Strike, Michel, & Kammerlander, 
2018; Suess, 2014). Family offices are widely used, most notably in the U.S. and Europe and 
increasingly in other parts of the world (Decker & Lange, 2013; Geveke, 2018; Glucksberg & 
Burrows, 2016; Zellweger & Kammerlander, 2015). Like family businesses, they interact with the 
institutional contexts in which they are embedded (Soleimanof, Rutherford, & Webb 2018).  
Although family offices are one of the most central advisors to families and their businesses, our 
knowledge is limited, especially concerning cross-national comparisons (Eigenheer, 2014). How 
national institutional environments influence family offices and how and why rules, norms and 
expectations change has hardly been analyzed (Zellweger & Kammerlander, 2015). Following the 
repeated calls for more attention to the institutional context in entrepreneurship and family 
business research (e.g., Stough, Welter, Block, Wennberg, & Basco, 2015; Welter, 2011; Wright, 
Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 2014), we ask, How and why do the institutional environments in which 
family offices are embedded change over time?  
To address this question, we content-analyze the newspaper coverage of family offices in the UK, 
Germany, Switzerland, and France from 2000 to 2018. Our coding scheme is inspired by Scott’s 
(2001) regulative, normative and cognitive pillars of institutions. The qualitative content analysis 
of newspaper articles through the application of these categories enables us to understand how 
institutions frame family offices in the four countries and to identify commonalities and differences 
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in the way newspapers report institutional changes and the actions of family offices (von Bloh, 
Broekel, Özgun, & Sternberg, 2019). The longitudinal approach provides the opportunity to 
analyze and compare institutional change and trace developments and trends.  
The study contributes to our understanding of the institutional context in which family offices are 
embedded, and of the critical incidents triggering institutional change across four European 
countries in which this central type of family business advisors is well-represented. Based on the 
dimensions and varieties of institutional contexts (Scott, 2001; Schneider & Paunescu, 2012), our 
findings highlight the relevance of context by identifying the drivers of institutional change and 
family offices’ actions. They reveal differences between the perception and framing of 
entrepreneurial families’ wealth and family offices in the UK, Switzerland, Germany, and France. 
The results also provide insights into failed attempts to change institutions. By engaging in 
comparative research and identifying novel causes of institutional change, as well as by analyzing 
failed attempts of change, we contribute to the larger body of literature on institutional change 
(Micelotta, Lounsbury, & Greenwood, 2017).  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. First, we review the literature on family 
business advisors, especially family offices, as well as on institutional contexts. Second, we 
elaborate on our data and methods and present the results. Finally, we discuss our findings and 
outline their implications for future research.  
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Family offices as an essential type of family business advisor 
Family business advisors have emerged as a new stream in the family business literature (Strike, 
2012; Reay, Pearson, & Dyer, 2013; Naldi et al., 2015). They can be, for example, accountants, 
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attorneys, lawyers, business consultants, financial service advisors, management consultants, 
family philanthropy managers, psychologists, and family therapists (Kaslow, 2006; Naldi et al., 
2015; Reay et al., 2013). Collaboration between advisors to the same family business is 
increasingly crucial as family businesses grow and require a more comprehensive range of 
advisory services (Su & Dou, 2013). It occurs through informal coordination between independent 
advisors or hierarchical coordination through a central advisor, such as a family office.  
The literature on family business advisors increasingly acknowledges the central role of family 
offices (Naldi et al., 2015; Reay et al., 2013; Strike, 2013; Strike et al., 2018; Welsh, Memili, 
Rosplock, & Segurado, 2013). They are professional bodies that rely on dedicated experts and act 
as an essential type of advisor to large entrepreneurial families and their businesses (Schickinger, 
Leitterstorf, & Kammerlander, 2018; Suess, 2014). “A family office serves as an administrative 
body that exercises control over complex financial and personal issues. It provides advice to one 
or more families over several generations” (Decker & Lange, 2013, p. 298). The service offerings 
involve the support of activities of entrepreneurial families and the coordination of other types of 
advisors (Jaffe & Lane, 2004; Strike et al., 2018; Welsh et al., 2013).  
Family offices as units to manage the personal and financial affairs of entrepreneurial families, 
such as the Rockefellers, emerged in the United States in the 19th century (Gray, 2005). Hauser 
(2001) describes three situations that led to their establishment in the U.S. First, successful 
entrepreneurs were so occupied with their operating companies that they needed support to manage 
their wealth and personal affairs (e.g., hiring household help, paying household and personal bills). 
Second, families require family offices after the sale of their operating business, either through a 
complete sale or an initial public offering. The liquidity event, and in many cases, the loss of the 
operating business, leads to an acute need for support. Third, the sudden wealth created by high-
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tech entrepreneurs since the late 1990s contributed to the spread of family offices. The increasing 
demand for sophisticated advice for business families outside the U.S. (Hauser, 2001) and the 
emergence of a new class of wealthy individuals in developed countries such as the UK and 
emerging markets (Beaverstock, Hall, & Wainwright, 2013) nurtured the global diffusion of family 
offices. They can be structured as a single-family office serving a sole family or a multi-family 
office providing services to multiple families. A multi-family office is either independent or 
affiliated with a financial services company or a bank (Decker & Lange, 2013; Wessel, Decker, 
Lange, & Hack, 2014).  
A separate stream of literature on family offices has emerged in (economic) sociology. In his study 
of the Weyerhaeuser family, Dunn (1980) analyzed how affluent families in the U.S. use family 
offices as a tool to reproduce their privileged social and economic position in society. Gilding 
(2005) outlined the importance of family offices for the accumulation, management succession, 
and inheritance of wealth in Australia. Glucksberg and Burrows (2016) studied the reproduction 
of dynastic wealth through family offices in the UK. Family offices are crucial for managing the 
financial and human capital of the family, and both aspects are intertwined. Other sociological 
contributions highlight the role of family offices in the transfer of wealth across generations and 
the reproduction of inequality in society (Harrington, 2016; Korom, Lutter, & Beckert, 2017).  
In recent years, the family office-concept has spread from the U.S. through Europe to Asia. Decker 
and Lange (2016) have demonstrated that a global organizational field of multi-family offices that 
make similar value propositions all over the world, has emerged. Eigenheer’s (2014) survey of 61 
family offices in North America, Europe, Switzerland, and Asia illustrates that the objectives and 
characteristics of family offices are similar across regions. Investment strategies, however, are 
influenced by the regional context. What remains unclear, though, is to what extent the institutional 
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environments in which family offices in different parts of the world are embedded vary and how 
they interact with family offices.  
2.2 Institutional context 
Strike (2012) highlights the effect of context on family advising. It can materialize in different 
ways. First, advising models differ across countries. Second, advising models developed for a 
national context must be adapted when transferred to another national context. Third, the level to 
which family businesses are willing to take advice differs across countries. Family business 
advisors play a negligible role in, for example, Central and South America (Lansberg & Perrow, 
1991), Turkey (Bork, 2006), South Korea (Kim, 2006), and Chile (Yunis, 2006), although family 
businesses dominate these economies. Reasons are, amongst others, a lack of societal trust and 
concerns over confidentiality (Strike, 2012; Vago, 2006).  
The institution-based perspective has gained significant influence in family business research 
(Soleimanof et al., 2018). Its rise can be attributed to a growing awareness of family firm 
heterogeneity (Chua, Chrisman, Steier, & Rau, 2012) and the relevance of context (Wright et al., 
2014). Scott (2001) distinguishes between three institutional dimensions of context: the regulative 
dimension relates to rules, the normative dimension to appropriate behavior, and the cognitive 
dimension to symbolic systems such as frames. Soleimanof et al. (2018) categorize the literature 
on the interactions between family firms and institutional contexts into four areas: first, the 
influence of formal institutions on family firms (Carney, 2005); second, the influence of informal 
institutions on family firms (Jaskiewicz, Combs, & Rau, 2015); third, the impact of family firms 
on formal institutions (Craig & Moores, 2010); and fourth, the influence of family firms on 
informal institutions (Seaman, 2015).  
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Comparative institutionalism emphasizes the interactions between actors and institutional, mostly 
national, contexts (Hotho & Saka-Helmhout, 2017). Scholars have developed different 
frameworks to categorize countries into capitalist varieties (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999). 
Schneider and Paunescu (2012) empirically identified three types of market economies: first, 
liberal market economies which encourage coordination via short-term market relations, such as 
UK, the U.S., and Switzerland; second, coordinated market economies which support long-term 
collaborative ties, such as Germany and France; and third, state-dominated economies in which 
the state directly influences relationships between different types of actors to a significant extent, 
such as Greece and Turkey. The differential role of family businesses and dedicated organizations 
serving entrepreneurial families in these different institutional contexts represents a promising 
avenue for research.  
 
3. Methods 
3.1 Data 
Europe has seen the establishment of an increasing number of family offices in the last decades 
(Eigenheer, 2014; Geveke, 2018). Using qualitative content analysis, we examine the evolution of 
institutional contexts and family offices in four European countries from 2000 to 2018. European 
family offices do not constitute a uniform organizational field (Rosplock, 2014), possibly due to 
the capitalist varieties in Europe (Hall & Soskice, 2001). We concentrated on the UK, Switzerland, 
Germany, and France. The UK and Switzerland are liberal market economies. Germany and France 
are coordinated market economies, although the latter differs from the former in terms of a strong 
state intervention, which is not typical for coordinated market economies (Schneider & Paunescu, 
2012).  
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The importance of family offices differs across these countries. The UK is the leading center for 
financial services in Europe (Decker & Lange, 2013; Rosplock, 2014). In Switzerland, which is 
not a member of the European Union, private banking and financial services for international 
investors have been offered for many decades, leading to the highest number of family offices in 
Europe (Decker & Günther, 2016; Geveke, 2018). Germany is the largest economy in Europe 
(Rosplock, 2014). It is shaped by traditional, medium-sized family-owned businesses (Decker & 
Lange, 2013), and driven by the expectation of the transfer of wealth from one generation to the 
next (Decker & Günther, 2016). In France, family offices are important because the French 
legislation hampers the transfer of wealth and ownership from one generation to the next. Many 
families sell their business after its founder’s death and invest the money resulting from the sale 
via a system of holding companies and family offices (Carney, Gedajlovic, & Strike, 2014).  
We used newspaper articles because they provide comparable information through time and across 
countries (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007) and are a credible and legitimate source of information 
in research adopting an institutional perspective (Graf-Vlachy, Oliver, Banfield, König, & Bundy, 
2019). Their use ensures the availability of comparable data that is independent of the access to 
informants (Duriau et al., 2007), which is difficult given the secrecy of family offices (Decker & 
Lange, 2013; Decker & Günther, 2016; Eigenheer, 2014; Glucksberg & Burrows, 2016). 
Newspapers provide a historical record of critical incidents, influence their interpretation, and 
convey impressions and opinions. They reflect the dynamics of stakeholders’ perceptions of family 
offices in their institutional contexts and the evolution of these contexts. Their bias reflects their 
core readers’ interests, journalists’ attitudes, and sources of information (Graf-Vlachy et al., 2019; 
Hoffman, 1999; von Bloh et al., 2019).  
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We retrieved 956 articles from the UK-based Financial Times [FT] (through the databases Factiva, 
Nexis and ProQuest), 80 articles from the Swiss Neue Zürcher Zeitung [NZZ] (through the wiso-
net database), 246 articles from the German Handelsblatt [HB] (through wiso-net), and 48 articles 
from the French Le Monde [LM] (through Factiva and Nexis). These newspapers regularly report 
on family offices. To be included in the sample, an article should have at least one mentioning of 
the term “family office” in the body text (Hoffman, 1999; Wonneberger & Jacobs, 2017). The 
spatial differences of newspaper coverage reflect the varying importance of family offices across 
the chosen countries. They are a typical feature of entrepreneurship research drawing on news 
items from different regions (von Bloh et al., 2019).  
3.2 Qualitative content analysis 
In a content analysis of written documents, words, phrases, and sentences are coded based on 
superordinate themes (Duriau et al., 2007). Because all authors speak English, German and French, 
we could independently and interchangeably read and code the newspaper coverage in the chosen 
countries. We proceeded in several steps. First, we read all articles, added notes and conceived of 
ideas for coding the data. The initial coding was based on the literature on family offices (e.g., 
Decker & Lange, 2013; Welsh et al., 2013), family business advisors (e.g., Naldi et al., 2015; 
Strike, 2013), and the institutional context (e.g., Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010; Hoffman, 1999). 
Second, guided by Scott’s (2001) institutional pillars, we developed a coding scheme in English, 
German and French using a sub-set of articles from the newspapers. Based on this, we refined the 
coding scheme and identified sub-categories specifying the superordinate themes. Third, we 
applied the coding scheme to the entire sample and analyzed the articles clause by clause. Any 
disagreements among the authors were settled by discussing each case. Fourth, we compiled the 
paragraphs and sentences that we had coded based on the same themes. Based on these 
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compilations, the coded data allowed for the identification of commonalities and differences across 
countries over time.  
Regarding the regulative dimension, we examined the legal constraints and changes in regulation 
over time. The regulative structures and activities that exert coercive influence on family offices 
and the families behind them to comply with laws and regulations (Leaptrott, 2005), are, for 
example, regulatory action and costs, including criticism of regulatory programs (either existing 
or proposed), the development of or rumors about new regulatory programs and laws, and politics 
and political lobbying (e.g., taxation, inheritance, investment, entrepreneurship, access to financial 
products, family business governance, succession) (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010; Hoffman, 1999).  
We shed light on the normative dimension by asking what desirable behaviors of family offices 
were. We drew on professional standards, operating procedures, accreditation, codes of conduct 
reflecting values and work ethics, and training and education (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006, 2010; 
Leaptrott, 2005). We also referred to voluntary professional associations, because they “represent 
business interests within specific domains, mobilizing the firms within these areas so that 
collective action can be taken on common problems” (Parada, Nordqvist, & Gimeno, 2010, p. 
356). They shape the activities of family offices and the discourse about them in a national context.  
The media tenor in the data captured the cognitive dimension. From an institutional perspective, 
the tone of media coverage is revealing concerning the social approval of an organization (Graf-
Vlachy et al., 2019). We examined whether family offices were framed favorably or unfavorably 
based on incidents affecting their reputation (Panico, Raithel, & Michel, 2014; Wonneberger & 
Jacobs, 2017).  
We assessed media prominence by asking whether or not “family office” was the primary topic in 
an article (Wonneberger & Jacobs, 2017). To identify critical incidents, we captured data on 
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functional issues, i.e., corporate ability or internal problems, and external issues, i.e., pertinent 
topics in society or challenges in the external environment (Hoffman, 1999; Panico et al., 2014; 
Wonneberger & Jacobs, 2017).  
 
4. Temporal patterns and media prominence 
Based on significant incidents affecting the European economy, we divided the newspaper 
coverage into four study periods. Period 1 covers 2000 to 2002. It witnessed the crash of the dot-
com bubble after excessive speculation in the 1990s and its impact on global financial investment 
(Alden, 2005). At the beginning of the 2000s, the Financial Times published 35 articles, among 
them ten primarily focusing on family offices. We found eight articles from the Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung, in which the term family office was mentioned at least once. In all but one article, this 
was a secondary topic. Period 1 was shaped by the emergence of a new market segment – wealthy 
families and individuals with an increasing interest in private equity as well as non-traditional and 
custom-tailored financial products – that led to the rise of family offices in the Swiss financial 
services industry. We identified nine articles in the Handelsblatt in which the term family office 
was mentioned. Two of them primarily focused on family offices. Le Monde published three 
articles in the early 2000s, among them two articles mainly focusing on family offices.  
Period 2, from 2003 to 2006, is a period of transition and recovery from the economic downturn 
in 2001 (Mann & Nunes, 2009). Fifty articles were published in the Financial Times, among them 
21 with a primary emphasis on family offices. Seven articles were published in the Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung, among them two with a primary focus on family offices. In Germany, the interest in 
family offices increased in Period 2. 22 articles were published. Among them, four articles 
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primarily focused on family offices. In France, the interest in family offices was low. Just one 
article in Le Monde referred to family offices. 
Period 3 covers 2007 to 2011. It witnessed the global financial crisis (2007-2008) and the recovery 
of the financial markets in its aftermath (Norris, 2011). In this period, 144 articles were published 
in the Financial Times, among them 44 primarily focusing on family offices. The Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung increased its coverage (19 articles, among them five with a primary focus on family 
offices), driven by the global financial crisis. In the German Handelsblatt, 30 articles covered 
family offices. Five articles primarily focused on family offices. Compared to the previous period, 
Le Monde slightly increased its coverage of family offices (15 articles, among them six mainly 
focusing on family offices).  
Period 4 (2012-2018) was shaped by increased regulation and the prospect of the UK to leave the 
European Union (EU). It shows an upsurge of newspaper coverage in the Financial Times, with 
353 articles mentioning family offices and 85 articles among them primarily concentrating on 
them. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung included 45 articles, among them eight mainly focusing on family 
offices. The final period witnessed a massive increase in the coverage of family offices in the 
Handelsblatt. 166 articles were published, among them 31 primarily focusing on family offices. 
Period 4 witnessed a rise in the number of family offices in France, echoing similar developments 
in other countries.With a total of 29 articles in Le Monde, the years between 2012 and 2018 showed 
the highest newspaper coverage in France in the period under study. Among them, just two articles 
primarily focused on family offices.  
In the four countries, newspapers rarely covered the family office-concept before the early 2000s. 
When we compare the coverage across countries from 2000 to 2018, the public interest has 
generally increased. According to Downs’ (1972) issue-attention cycle, newspaper coverage is 
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initially low because the awareness of an issue in the public sphere is low. The subsequent increase 
in public interest reflects the rise in newspaper coverage. Eventually, public awareness decreases. 
The decrease is consistent with a decline in the number of articles.  
 
Fig. 1. Media prominence across countries and study periods 
Figure 1 illustrates that, when we compare the percentages of articles with the family office as a 
primary topic (i.e., media prominence) in each study period, the patterns in three newspapers 
resemble Downs’ (1972) issue-attention cycle. Only the Handelsblatt shows an inverted curve. 
This finding indicates that family offices as a central type of family business advisors have become 
established economic actors in the last two decades.  
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5. Results 
5.1 Regulative dimension 
The regulation was hardly emphasized in the Financial Times in Period 1. However, taxation and 
the increasing complexity of cross-border business transactions were discussed as a factor 
affecting wealthy families’ financial needs. In the Handelsblatt, the regulative dimension was 
more critical. German regulation was considered unfavorable for wealthy families and mainly 
focusing on the redistribution of wealth. As this regulatory environment made wealth preservation 
more difficult for entrepreneurial families, family offices became more attractive.  
Preserving and optimizing a big fortune across generations implies a particular responsibility for European 
families. In contrast to the situation in the U.S. or the Far East, the policies of most European governments 
are not conducive to wealthy families, neither today nor in the future. Tax law, social law and industrial 
policy do not aim at continuity but reallocation of wealth. The institution “family office” has the promising 
objective to use globalization and asset allocation to avoid this tendency and simultaneously govern the 
increasing complexity of big fortunes professionally. [HB 21/11/2001] 
In the Swiss and French newspapers, none of the articles referred to the regulative dimension.  
In Period 2, regulative issues were barely discussed by the Financial Times, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 
and Le Monde. Conversely, the German Handelsblatt reported that regulatory reforms allowed 
private investors for the first time to invest in hedge funds. This change indirectly supported family 
offices because it increased their opportunities to invest on behalf of their clients.  
In Period 3, regulative issues gained in importance in the Financial Times around 2008. Both the 
U.S. and the British government started considering tighter regulation of family offices.  
Super-rich families are bracing for more aggressive demands to disclose details of their financial affairs as 
tax authorities step up their focus on the international wealth set. Wealth advisers warn that London risks 
driving away many of the super-rich families that have set up private investment and governance offices in 
the capital over the past decade if they are confronted by demands to reveal what they consider to be too 
much private information. [FT 18/12/2009] 
Similarly, in Switzerland, the regulative dimension became relevant. Foreign tax laws, especially 
in the U.S., put pressure on the Swiss banking secrecy:  
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On Thursday, President Obama signed a legislative package that also comprised the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act. This requires financial institutions abroad that they identify their clients from the U.S. and 
report detailed information to the U.S.-American tax authorities RIS. [NZZ 19/03/2010] 
This development had consequences for Swiss family offices: 
If a family office, a foundation or a trust has an account with a Swiss bank, then an American partner suffices 
to trigger reporting requirements. [NZZ 19/03/2010] 
In the French Le Monde, Period 3 was shaped by regulative initiatives to combat tax evasion, led 
by Eric Woerth, Minister of Budget, Public Accounts, Public Service and State Reform:  
In June 2009, the fiscal authority of Bercy received lists of suspects that had transferred their fortunes to 
Switzerland or tax havens. Eric Woerth targeted these individuals, thereby offering a delay or a settlement – 
that means, making a payment without penalties – to those who agreed to repatriate their fortunes. In the 
“family offices”, those wealth management structures that had been developed by the Rockefellers at the end 
of the 19th century, this initiative raised concerns. [LM 29/06/2010] 
The Handelsblatt also reported regulatory changes affecting family offices. In 2009, a flat tax on 
private income on capital gains replaced the previously used personal tax rate. This change 
improved the situation of clients in Germany to some extent. However, the clients of family offices 
holding their assets with Swiss banks were not subject to a similar tax.  
Changes in regulation were implemented across the four countries in Period 4. In the UK, 
increasing regulatory scrutiny accompanied by a growing number of families whose “members are 
scattered around the globe and need to be able to transact in those countries” [FT 06/11/2013] led 
to the requirement for many family offices to build up expertise in multiple jurisdictions. New 
taxation rules for international families in the UK, echoing the increased regulation in other 
countries, created challenges for many family offices and their clients:  
The decision by George Osborne, the UK chancellor, to scrap the permanent non-domicile status has created 
issues for London’s family offices and their clients. The move, announced as part of this year’s summer 
Budget, means those who have lived in the UK for more than 15 of the past 20 years will be deemed UK 
domiciled as of April 6 2017, subjecting their foreign income and gains to taxation. [FT 23/10/2015]  
Regulatory initiatives like this that mainly put multi-family offices and their clients under pressure 
nurtured concerns that single-family offices would be subject to regulation as well shortly because 
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of the high amounts of assets under management and the sophisticated financial products in use, 
among them co-investments with other family offices:  
“When one family office starts providing services to another, it needs to be very careful about looking at the 
regulations that apply to these activities,” says Grum. “Regulations that might affect co-investing are one of 
the areas that can catch family offices out.” [FT 20/10/2017] 
Besides, the decision of the UK to leave the European Union may make purely UK-based family 
offices less attractive for families from abroad:  
For the wealthy with houses around the world, national ties are largely irrelevant. What counts more is 
political stability and security — and an advantageous tax regime. And while Britain pulling out of the EU 
might seem more about trade and economics, the super-rich are deeply worried about the knock-on effects 
of a potential Brexit. [FT 04/03/2016] 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, Switzerland continued to be an attractive location for family 
offices serving an international customer base, but pressures for regulation increased substantially.  
Especially policy-makers feel a strong pressure to put shackles on the financial services industry when fraud 
or a financial crisis reveals alleged deficiencies in regulation. In 2012, when the Parliament debated the 
revision of the KAG [Kollektivanlagengesetz, Swiss Collective Investment Schemes Act], a broad mandatory 
record was included in the law rather at the last minute. It says that, if a Swiss asset manager sells an 
investment to a pension fund or a family office, the asset manager must report the reasons why he/she 
recommended the product to this client, even though these clients are investors who should be aware of the 
chances and risks of financial investments. [NZZ 16/04/2014] 
A new regulatory framework – denoted as Financial Institutions Act (FINIG) and Financial 
Services Act (FINLEG) that introduced new conduct rules as well as licensing and supervision 
regimes for portfolio managers, investment advisors, trustees, and FinTech companies – was 
discussed throughout Period 4. In November 2015, the Federal Council eventually adopted it. With 
FINIG and FINLEG, Switzerland followed international regulatory requirements, in particular, the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) introduced by the European Union to 
enhance transparency in all asset classes and investor protection. Though not directly affected, 
Swiss family office advisors feared that these new directives would increase their administrative 
burden and challenge the business models of many private banks.  
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In Germany, family offices report to the German financial regulatory authority BaFin and the 
German Central Bank every quarter. In contrast to insurance companies and other financial 
institutions that manage pension schemes, they are not constrained in their investment decisions. 
In Period 4, there was a significant concern among family offices that this might change. They did 
not rule out the possibility of relocations if more regulation was introduced. Many owners of 
independent family offices – i.e., not affiliated with or owned by a bank – criticized the lack of 
legal protection of the family office as a distinct concept. This lack of clarity had led to an 
“inflationary use of the term family office” [HB 03/11/2014] among financial services providers, 
such as banks, investment advisors, or tax counsellors. In 2014, some independent family offices 
thus formed an association, the Verband unabhängiger Family Offices (VuFO, Association of 
Independent Family Offices).  
The Association will pursue its interests towards the legislative bodies and authorities. “Especially in 
awareness of the current waves of regulation it is important to distinguish between actual, independent family 
offices and big, bank-affiliated family office-factories”, emphasizes Erdmann. [HB 03/11/2014] 
French family offices were more advanced in this regard. The concept had officially been 
established and integrated into the French language in 2012:  
The term family office describes an enterprise managing family issues, such as the holdings of the Dassault 
and Peugeot families, or BMGI, the organization that manages the fortune of the Microsoft founder and the 
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. It also covers the delegation of these services to providers external to the 
family. In a commendable effort to enhance precision, the term has officially been translated into “manager 
of high fortunes”, based on the suggestion of the commission for terminology and economic and financial 
neology. It was validated in the official Journal on 17 June 2012. The French definition of the family office 
is hence “a specialized organism in the administrative and financial management of considerable assets”. 
[LM 07/03/2018] 
Nonetheless, the regulative issues discussed in this period created an unfavorable environment for 
wealthy families in France. Taxation is a case in point:  
On 12th April 2011, President Nicolas Sarkozy’s official decision to abolish the fiscal protection of big 
fortunes, with which he met the expectations of the majority of the Members of Parliament, acted as a cold 
shower for the super-rich. According to a confidential report provided by Parisian lawyers in March 2011, 
there has been a “considerable” increase in demand for relocation since the moment when the presidential 
decision became likely. [LM 07/02/2012] 
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Tax regulation did not only nurture the relocation of family offices in more favorable legal 
environments but also philanthropy among family entrepreneurs who were planning to sell their 
business and a higher demand for philanthropy advice:  
The banks also direct the business owners’ attention to philanthropy. “We create awareness among our clients 
when they are engaging with succession planning, because at that time if planned properly, philanthropy will 
be most effective in economic terms”, says Charles Bienaimé, member of the Board of Directors of 
Meeschaert Family Office. Indeed, if an entrepreneur transfers a certain amount of the revenues from the sale 
of the business to a foundation, the owner reduces the tax burden emanating from the sale. [LM 07/06/2017] 
Overall, the coverage focusing on the regulative dimension generally increases over time. It reveals 
substantial changes in Switzerland, the UK, and France in Period 3 and even more in Period 4, but 
no regulatory change in Germany. 
5.2 Normative dimension 
In Period 1, normative issues were intensely discussed in the Financial Times, indicating the 
novelty of family offices in the early 2000s. For example, independent advice, neutrality, trust, 
secrecy and custom-tailored services were described as desirable features. However,  
Critics worry that these new “family offices” are little more than a new label for an old private banking 
service. The term has become a catch-all term for long-term services offered to wealthy families who need 
to transfer and manage wealth through the generations. [FT 26/06/2002] 
This quote indicates that the family office-concept was not well understood. Many articles 
elaborated on the services provided by family offices, thereby often presenting the first-hand 
experience from family office advisors in Switzerland and the U.S. 
In the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, the normative dimension was touched upon by two articles. These 
emphasized the need for individualized and holistic services, based on a deep understanding of a 
wide range of asset classes and family-related issues. The Handelsblatt emphasized independence 
as a desirable feature of family offices. Articles referred to the lack of independence of family 
office units of large banks, their incentive to sell their own products, and the lack of clarity of who 
qualifies as a potential family office client.  
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The term “family office” implies holistic service offerings for multimillionaires: (…) Who is “rich” and thus 
worthy of using these services is an issue to be defined by the provider of these services? [HB 26/04/2002] 
In normative terms, family offices were expected to offer holistic solutions that encompassed tax 
and inheritance planning. Large banks such as Deutsche Bank expanded their family office 
services and provided them with some autonomy. The rise of family offices in Germany was driven 
by large numbers of very wealthy families and family businesses that often faced succession 
challenges and were thus sold to outsiders. 
The French Le Monde also referred to normative issues. The advent of the family office in France 
was triggered by the need for imitating the U.S.-style family office, which motivated the formation 
of the Association française du Family Office (AFFO) in October 2001. It aimed to specify 
common standards for family office professionals in an early stage of market development:  
Encouraged by experts in wealth management (bank advisors, notaries, wealth managers, etc.), it aims to 
familiarize the interested intermediaries with the techniques of the family office. [LM 24/09/2001] 
As its President Bernard Camblain put it: 
Some families have already decided to entrust the management of their fortunes to a dedicated team of 
advisors. But these are not numerous, or they do this with specialists in Geneva or London. We are convinced 
that there is a more substantial demand. But it is still latent. It is the particular goal of the AFFO to provide a 
platform to utter this demand. [LM 19/11/2001] 
Le Monde did not raise any normative matters in Period 2. Conversely, compared to Period 1, a 
change in normative issues is discernible in the Financial Times. Financial education regarding 
the inter-generational transfer of wealth became increasingly important, thereby placing more 
emphasis on family characteristics in Period 2 than in Period 1. Topics included not only financial 
competence but also psychological and ethical issues surrounding the family and its wealth. Many 
articles described the formation and services of renowned British family offices, such as Sand 
Aire, Fleming Family & Partners, and Stanhope, which were examples for newly-established 
multi-family offices – a concept that was less widespread in the UK than in the U.S. at that time. 
By attracting British clients outside the founding family and from emerging economies, they 
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heavily invested in international expansion and did not hesitate to compete with powerful Asia-
based private banking groups. Fleming, established in 2000 after the Fleming family had sold its 
original business to Chase Manhattan, is a case in point: 
Over the past six years, the firm has signed up 35 core clients – ranging from long-established UK families 
to entrepreneurs – which account for two thirds of the firm’s Dollars 8.3bn of assets under management. (…) 
In an effort to expand into Asia and the Middle East, the firm last year sold a 20 per cent stake to Standard 
Chartered, the emerging markets bank, valuing the business at Pounds 225m. [FT 13/11/2006] 
Even though many private banks were expanding in multi-family office services, many clients 
preferred setting up their own family offices that they soon opened to other families to pool 
resources and expertise. This development demonstrated “the growing desire for wealthy families 
to put their money in the hands of a sophisticated but independent institution” [FT 10/12/2005] 
and get access to new investment opportunities, such as hedge funds, alternative investments, and 
private equity, which were usually unavailable to private investors. 
The Neue Zürcher Zeitung revealed wealth owners’ growing discontent with the available financial 
services and, as a result, increasing market potential for family offices providing bespoke services. 
This discontent led to the discussion of the economic pre-conditions for the set-up and maintenance 
of family offices and the nature of family offices, the latter prompted by the interest of large banks 
in the acquisition of independent and well-renowned family offices. The articles emphasized the 
need for independence, professionalism, neutrality, and holistic product and service offerings. 
Non-financial issues, such as knowledge exchange with like-minded families, family governance, 
family education, and succession planning, increasingly came to the fore.  
In the Handelsblatt, the need for independent and personal advice and the importance of long-
standing relationships between families and advisors were emphasized:  
“Many business families are looking for custom-tailored concepts, which, however, require a lot of consulting 
work and are time-consuming”, says Lutz Gebser, Chairman of the Board of the Verband unabhängiger 
Vermögensverwalter (VuV, Association of Independent Asset Managers). Thereby, most of them want to 
have a permanent advisor. “In banks, advisors are likely to change frequently, but asset managers don’t do 
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this”, says Gebser. (…) “It is important that the families get personal advice that is custom-tailored to their 
needs”, says the manager. [HB 15/05/2006] 
The rise of family offices was driven by the expected wave of family business successions in the 
years to come:  
According to estimates, in Germany, approximately 70,000 small- to medium-sized enterprises per year must 
clarify succession issues. Specialists in private banks can use their experience and expertise to support critical 
decisions. In that vein, especially the prospect of custom-tailored family office-services can provide an 
important strategic approach. [HB 01/03/2006] 
Large private banks continued to be interested in family office services. Sal. Oppenheim acquired 
Luxembourg-based Service Généraux de Gestion to expand its family office unit. The Swiss UBS 
bought one of the largest independent German family offices, Sauerborn Trust AG, and Deutsche 
Bank acquired the private bank Wilhelm von Finck. Both banks highlighted that the acquired 
entities would remain autonomous, indicating that they were well aware of their clients’ desire for 
independent advice. 
In Period 3, according to the Financial Times, independence remained a desirable characteristic of 
family offices. It was driven by a more pronounced need for safety, professionalism and high-
quality services guaranteed by multi-family offices:  
While the multi-family offices have grown significantly in recent years, the credit crisis has given them a 
further boost. The turmoil in the credit markets has prompted many families to review their financial affairs. 
“For the first time in four years we are seeing potential clients sitting up and saying: ‘Are we getting the best 
service?’” says Gavin Rochussen, chief executive of Fleming Family & Partners, the multi-family office 
originally set up to manage the wealth of the 150-strong banking family. At the same time, many wealthy 
families that previously relied on large private banks have increasingly sought independent advice. “The 
crisis has definitely moved client perceptions on what is considered to be safe,” says Giuseppe Ciucci, chief 
executive of Stonehage, which started out administering the affairs of wealthy South African families, and 
has expanded since. “People have realised that independence is worth quite a lot.” [FT 07/06/2008] 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, many family offices started implementing governance 
procedures, such as board, audit and compliance functions, although they were not legally forced 
to do so. Especially single-family offices that had invested in hedge funds in previous years, had 
difficulties in balancing their costs. Many wealthy families thus turned away from single-family 
offices and towards multi-family offices that could offer a more advantageous cost structure. 
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Generally, the beginning of Period 3 witnessed a steady growth of family offices in London, 
fostering an increasing demand for advice in, for example, taxation for non-domiciled individuals, 
cross-border administration, consolidated investment reporting and philanthropy.  
Scorpio estimates there are now more than 1,700 super-rich people worth over £50m in the UK, with total 
assets of almost £460bn, far more than in rival European markets such as France, Spain and Italy. (…) Mr 
Dovey highlighted what he called “significant individual wealth creation events” in London - such as the 
arrival of a new cadre of Russian billionaires and more entrepreneurs choosing to sell their companies - that 
had served to swell the ranks of the very rich in the capital. Another important factor in luring the ultra-
wealthy to London was the ease with which financial transactions could be carried out owing to the presence 
of a network of high-level legal and investment advisers “as well as the beneficial tax environment for 
individuals - notably resident non-doms”. He predicts the rate at which new family offices are being set up 
in London will not slow for another 12-24 months, especially in the multi-family-office sector. [FT 
04/08/2008] 
This growth was enabled by an influx of new clients from abroad:  
Until recently, Scott - himself fourth-generation wealthy - dealt mainly with the old-style, old-money rich. 
But his new clients have acquired their fortunes at greater speed. “It is clear that very significant sums have 
been made more recently,” he says. From exclusively managing their own family fortune in 1996, Sand Aire 
now handles 14 clients with combined assets of around $2bn. (…) The big growth has been from first-
generation wealthy - from Russia, Asia and the Middle East - who have turned London into a global centre 
for private client legal advice. [FT 26/10/2007] 
Given that the financial sector accounts for a substantial fraction of the Swiss economy, many 
articles in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung revealed concerns about the suitability of the existing business 
models in this industry. Conversely, the German Handelsblatt did not question the business 
models, but it highlighted that family office managers require an extensive range of expertise and 
the courage to openly disagree with wealthy clients.  
A family officer must be able to listen very well while simultaneously being bold enough to contradict the 
client openly: “I know how entrepreneurs feel, think and act”, explains Duske. “They are often surrounded 
by yes-sayers.” Honesty and contradiction are hence appreciated. (…) “A family officer needs a 
comprehensive education”, he says. Knowledge in taxation and finance are as valuable as marketing, 
management and law. “We must be a step ahead of what we read in business journals”, he explains. [HB 
20/03/2009] 
In France, the Association française du Family Office decided to safeguard against the threat of 
misuse of the concept: 
The term “family office” is increasingly over-used. With a good address book, everybody can use it. 
Therefore, the Association française du family office - that comprises professionals advising families with a 
fortune ranging from 10 to 15 million euros - has decided to relinquish its legendary discretion. [LM 
05/12/2009] 
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The coverage reflects the need to define the family office, specify its tasks and purpose for wealthy 
families, and establish standards for operating procedures and good practice. 
Driven by a decreasing trust towards private banks in the aftermath of the financial crisis, Period 
4 witnessed increasing popularity of family office services provided by different types of 
organizations, mainly denoted as multi-family offices, but the Financial Times also reveals some 
concerns:  
Not everyone in the family office space is happy about the growth of MFOs, however. Some have questioned 
whether they should even be called "family offices", given that more often than not, they do not have a 
founding family at the centre but a bank with deep coffers and a clever marketing strategy. “Many firms have 
set up what they like to call MFOs, but which are nothing more than glorified asset managers”, says Jon 
Needham, global head of fiduciary services at wealth manager SGPB Hambros. “I refer to them as wolves in 
sheep’s clothing. It is doing a disservice to those that I consider genuine family offices, such as single-family 
offices (SFOs), which actually have a founding family at their heart.” [FT 25/11/2014] 
Period 4 also witnessed a change in the claim for secrecy. Single-family offices continued to insist 
on preserving the confidential nature of their services. However, driven by “the explosion of wealth 
in the past few decades and dissatisfaction with the poor performance of portfolios handled by 
global private banks” [FT 06/11/2013], many multi-family offices deliberately turned the spotlight 
on their service offerings for wealthy families and engaged with consolidation and international 
expansion. For example, London-based Stanhope Capital maintained an office in Geneva “to 
service the needs of families from Switzerland, Latin America and the Middle East who have 
traditionally banked there” [FT 06/11/2013] and “London-based SandAire joined with five other 
heavyweight MFOs from around the world to form the Wigmore Association and share investment 
research” [FT 07/11/2013]. In 2014, Fleming Family & Partners merged with its competitor 
Stonehage “to become the largest independent multi-family office in Europe, the Middle East and 
Africa” [FT 08/02/2015] and exploit cost savings in a global economic environment shaped by 
increasing regulation, low-interest rates and pressures on pricing. 
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In Switzerland, the normative dimension covered by the Neue Zürcher Zeitung reflects a sceptical 
attitude towards formerly independent family offices. The importance of acting as a trusted advisor 
for the family was stressed:  
Because of the preeminent importance of preserving wealth, it is obvious to engage an advisor for a 
substantial amount of the family office-services, who has proven expertise in the holistic management of 
wealth and a relevant network of complementary specialists. The typical role as a “trusted advisor” who 
enjoys the family’s trust, coordinates relationships and processes, is an internal sparring partner and 
represents the family’s interests externally. [NZZ 17/09/2014] 
According to the German Handelsblatt, in terms of desirable behavior, clients asked for 
personalized investment advice and independence, meaning that family offices were expected not 
to sell their own products. They preferred fee-based over commission-based compensation. The 
VuFO integrated these demands into its formal membership guidelines.  
Le Monde reported that, in contrast to their role models in the U.S., French family offices were 
less well organized, and the development of standards for their operating procedures was still in 
progress in Period 4:  
In the U.S. where these offices emerged in the 19th century, the industry is very organized, with some 
heavyweights such as Northern Trust or Bessemer Trust, which both have the assets of thousands of families 
under management. “There, it’s an industry”, admits a French professional. “Here, it’s still a fairly opaque 
niche market.” But it is a market that begins to develop and establish rules. One of the critical issues is the 
family officers’ remuneration. According to the AFFO, they must be paid transparently based on the efforts 
and time they invest, but not in the percentage of assets under management. And, in any case, never in terms 
of yachts. [LM 30/03/2017] 
To sum up, the normative dimension was most intensely covered in the first two study periods. 
The Financial Times deviates from this pattern with the highest percentages of articles covering 
normative issues in Period 2 and 4.  
5.3 Cognitive dimension 
In Period 1, family offices were mainly framed in a favorable manner. Both the Financial Times 
and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung took a positive stance. In the German Handelsblatt, all articles 
described family offices in favorable terms, though two of them expressed some concerns. 
Similarly, the French newspaper coverage was favorable. It reflected minor concerns resulting 
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from the newness of the concept, leading to detailed explanations of the structures and tasks of a 
family office. 
This positive stance hardly changed in Period 2. There were hardly any critical voices in the UK 
and Switzerland. In the German Handelsblatt, all but two articles were favorable. There was some 
dissatisfaction with family offices owned by banks as very wealthy clients were only one among 
several customer groups. In the French Le Monde, the coverage was also favorable. The articles 
reflect the novelty of the concept in France in the early 2000s as well as the need to elaborate on 
the tasks and meaning of family offices for preserving a family’s wealth and legacy. 
In Period 3, the coverage in the Financial Times was more critical than in previous periods, with 
33 articles framing family offices unfavorably. In Switzerland, despite environmental turbulences, 
the coverage remained mainly favorable. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung described Switzerland as a 
global hub for a growing number of family offices serving families from multiple jurisdictions.  
In the German Handelsblatt, four articles had an unfavorable stance. The private bank Sal. 
Oppenheim mainly triggered negative coverage. Initially, they received criticism for moving 
headquarters from Cologne/Germany to Luxembourg. The suspicion was that this decision had 
been influenced by the country’s low-tax environment for international investors. More damaging 
to the reputation of family offices was its involvement in a significant investment scandal in which 
Sal. Oppenheim was accused of advising clients to invest in funds without informing them about 
their considerable risks. The bank’s activities were also central to internal issues. It embarked on 
an international expansion program, involving acquisitions of two family offices in Luxembourg. 
It also planned to expand into Switzerland, India, and Poland. However, poor investment decisions 
resulted in high financial losses and cost the bank its independence. Eventually, Deutsche Bank – 
aiming to strengthen its family office unit – acquired Sal. Oppenheim.  
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Le Monde covered family offices favorably at the beginning of Period 3. This is in contrast to later 
articles regarding Clymène, the family office of L’Oréal heiress Liliane Bettencourt, one of the 
richest women worldwide at that time. Clymène came under scrutiny within Eric Woerth’s 
(Minister of Budget, Public Accounts, Public Service and State Reform) initiative to combat tax 
evasion. It had invested in risky financial products designed for tax optimization. Bettencourt was 
accused of having avoided paying taxes by keeping a substantial amount of her money in 
undeclared Swiss bank accounts. Eric Woerth’s wife Florence was one of the managers of 
Clymène. Despite her resignation, the linkage between the family office of a prominent figure and 
the political elite raised suspicions of political protection of the illegal financial transactions of the 
super-rich and decreased Woerth’s credibility as a minister fighting against tax evasion. The 
articles covering the Clymène case were detrimental to the reputation of family offices in France.  
In Period 4, 102 articles in the Financial Times can be viewed as critical or unfavorable, reporting 
on, for example, clients’ dissatisfaction with global capital markets and inter-family conflicts in 
club deals promoted by some multi-family offices.  
Although 21 out of 29 articles in Le Monde took a mainly positive stance, the French newspaper 
coverage was also critical. Similarly, the Swiss newspaper coverage remained positive, but it 
framed the family office-concept less favorable than previously. For example, between 2013 and 
2018, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung repeatedly covered a prominent case of alleged tax evasion. The 
Swiss tax authorities claimed that the entrepreneur Urs Schwarzenbach who was officially 
domiciled in the UK had not correctly declared more than 200 works of art totalling approximately 
130 million Swiss francs to avoid paying value-added tax in Switzerland. His family office – Villa 
Falkenstein in Zurich – came under scrutiny. The Swiss tax authorities and legal bodies suspected 
professional art-dealing there and refused to treat it as a private family office exempted from tax. 
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Schwarzenbach argued that he had bought these works of art in the UK and that his employees in 
Zurich had just provided some administrative support. Another topic that was critically covered 
was the independence of family offices that had been acquired by large banks. For instance,  
in 2004 UBS acquired Sauerborn Trust that was managing the fortunes of about 100 wealthy families. This 
acquisition increased the assets under management from 10 billion to 16 billion euros in one swoop. 
However, because many families did not appreciate the change from a family office to a major bank, the 
potential of this transaction could never be fully used. [NZZ 14/11/2012] 
In the Handelsblatt, 29 articles discussed family offices in unfavorable terms. For instance, the 
Sal. Oppenheim scandal that had emerged in Germany in Period 3 continued to be relevant. In 
Period 4, Sal. Oppenheim became involved in a new scandal. It had advised wealthy clients to 
invest in questionable funds. Deutsche Bank, the new owner of Sal. Oppenheim, analyzed these 
funds and concluded that they enabled money laundering. The bank hence filed lawsuits against 
several clients and bank managers. Clients, who had been advised to invest in these funds, 
perceived this legal action as a massive breach of trust. Moreover, the Handelsblatt reported a 
range of examples in which family offices had misinformed their clients, for example, referring to 
the risks associated with dividend-stripping practices involving dispersed tax refunds (denoted as 
cum-ex-funds), or in which the family office-concept had been misused to gain unfair personal 
advantages. 
Table 1 summarizes our findings and illustrates commonalities and differences in the drivers, 
outcomes and extent of institutional change across countries and over time.  
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UK Switzerland Germany France 
P1 regulative (3 ≈ 9%): no change 
normative (9 ≈ 26%): no change but 
discussion of normative issues 
cognitive (31 favorable ≈ 89%): 
mainly positive stance 
regulative (0): no change 
normative (2 ≈ 25%): the need for 
individualized and holistic services  
cognitive (8 favorable ≈ 100%): 
positive stance  
regulative (2 ≈ 22%): no change 
normative (4 ≈ 44%): need driven 
by the expected succession wave 
in German family businesses 
cognitive (9 favorable ≈ 100%): 
positive stance  
regulative (0): no change  
normative (2 ≈ 67%): change in 
ideas on wealth management leading 
to the establishment of the AFFO 
cognitive (3 favorable ≈ 100%): 
positive stance  
P2 regulative (2 ≈ 4%): no change 
normative (16 ≈ 32%): financial 
education and intergenerational 
transfer of wealth, MFOs as a new 
trend, increasing emphasis on 
independence and sophisticated 
investment opportunities 
cognitive (47 favorable ≈ 94%): 
mainly positive stance 
regulative (2 ≈ 29%): no change 
normative (3 ≈ 43%): increasing 
focus on what an FO should do 
and non-financial issues 
cognitive (6 favorable ≈ 86%): 
mainly positive stance  
regulative (4 ≈ 18%): broadening 
investment opportunities of FOs 
normative (11 ≈ 50%): ongoing 
discussion driven by the expected 
succession wave in German 
family businesses 
cognitive (20 favorable ≈ 91%): 
mainly positive stance  
regulative (0): no change 
normative (0): no change 
cognitive (1 favorable ≈ 100%): no 
change 
P3 regulative (22 ≈ 15%): US 
legislation as a role model, plans of 
the UK government that eventually 
did not materialize 
normative (36 ≈ 25%): no change 
cognitive (107 favorable ≈ 74%): 
more critical stance 
regulative (3 ≈ 16%): pressures 
from abroad influencing the 
business models of Swiss FOs 
normative (4 ≈ 21%): no change 
cognitive (17 favorable ≈ 89%): 
mainly positive stance 
regulative (7 ≈ 23%): minor 
positive change in taxation with an 
indirect effect on FOs 
normative (8 ≈ 27%): FO as a 
trusted advisor 
cognitive (26 favorable ≈ 87%): 
some critical coverage of central 
actors’ detrimental behavior 
regulative (3 ≈ 20%): regulative 
initiatives to combat tax evasion 
with an indirect effect on FOs  
normative (3 ≈ 20%): discussion 
about definition and tasks of FOs 
cognitive (8 favorable  ≈ 53%): 
critical coverage of central actors’ 
questionable behavior  
P4 regulative (77 ≈ 22%): new taxation 
rules for international families  
normative (98 ≈ 28%): increase in 
international families promoting 
internationalization and MFOs 
cognitive (251 favorable ≈ 71%): 
critical though still positive stance 
regulative (13 ≈ 29%): substantial 
pressures for change from abroad, 
leading to significant indirect 
effects on FOs 
normative (10 ≈ 22%): discussion 
about the independence of FOs 
cognitive (36 favorable ≈ 80%): 
more critical stance  
regulative (38 ≈ 23%): rumors 
about unfavorable changes for 
FOs and their clients 
normative (49 ≈ 30%): need for an 
FO-definition leading to the 
establishment of the VuFO  
cognitive (139 favorable ≈ 84%): 
ongoing scandals 
regulative (5 ≈ 17%): binding 
definition of FOs in 2012  
normative (3 ≈ 10%): ongoing 
discussion of normative issues spills 
over to regulation and legitimizes 
the FO- concept 
cognitive (21 favorable ≈ 72%): 
mainly positive but critical stance  
Notes: P = study period, FO = family office, MFO = multi-family office.  
Number of articles and percentage of overall coverage per institutional dimension in parentheses. 
Table 1. Commonalities and differences across countries and study periods 
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6. Discussion and conclusions 
6.1 Commonalities and differences 
The coverage focusing on the regulative dimension illustrates that some changes worsened the 
environment for family offices. For instance, in Switzerland, U.S. tax legislation undermined the 
country’s banking secrecy; national laws that followed regulatory changes introduced by the EU 
indirectly increased the administrative burden of Swiss family offices. In the UK, the abolishment 
of the tax exemption for a significant portion of wealthy individuals non-domiciled in the country 
hurt family offices. In France, the higher taxation of vast fortunes reduced the attractiveness of the 
country for this type of financial actor and encouraged investment in trusts to mitigate tax. That 
the three countries implemented regulation that negatively affected family offices was due to 
internal and external reasons. Specifically, internal factors triggered the higher taxation of big 
fortunes in France. Similarly, they prompted the higher taxation of wealthy individuals non-
domiciled in the UK. In Switzerland, in contrast, external pressure in terms of regulatory changes 
in the U.S. and the EU led to tighter regulation of family offices. The fact that external forces 
shaped Swiss law highlights that the impact of international activity on country-level institutional 
systems should not be downplayed (Tempel & Walgenbach, 2007). This development supports the 
coercion thesis (Koning, Mertens, & Rosenboom, 2018), according to which adoption is likely if 
international organizations strongly influence a country.  
In France, the legal protection of what constitutes a family office enhanced their reputation and 
improved the environment of family offices. The attempt of the German association VuFO to 
achieve the same goal failed. These initiatives to impose a family office-definition are theoretically 
relevant as there is limited knowledge on how family businesses or dedicated institutions influence 
the institutional environment (Soleimanof et al., 2018). Failed attempts to develop institutions are 
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underexplored in institutional theory and worthy of analysis (Micelotta et al., 2017). From a 
comparative institutionalism perspective, a French-German comparison might be intriguing as this 
literature classifies both countries as coordinated market economies that support collaboration 
between different types of actors (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Schneider & Paunescu, 2012). That the 
relevant industry association in Germany was not able to legally protect the family office-concept 
is surprising, given the strong position of industry associations in coordinated market economies. 
An explanation might be that the founding members of its French equivalent AFFO were well-
established within the country’s financial system. They represented renowned private banks and 
family business advisors. The founding members of the VuFO were more peripheral to the 
influential circles of Germany’s financial system. They attempted to protect a family office-
concept that went against the interests of the financial elite represented by, for example, Deutsche 
Bank. Specifically, the VuFO aims at confining the family office-concept to providers that do not 
sell their own financial products, which rarely applies to banks. If change initiatives do not fit into 
the broader national institutional context or undermine the position of powerful actors, they tend 
to fail or lack effectiveness (Eesley, Li, & Yang, 2016; Hall & Thelen, 2008). Apart from that, the 
fact that the liberal market economies of the UK and Switzerland witnessed more negative 
institutional changes than the coordinated market economies to the regulatory framework, 
especially Germany, is unexpected. Liberal market economies tend to be more supportive of 
financial investors than coordinated economies (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Jung, Aguilera, & 
Goyer, 2015).  
Regarding the normative dimension, across the four countries, the growth in global wealth and the 
internationalization of families pursuing entrepreneurial opportunities all over the world nurtured 
an increase in demand for multi-family offices with branches in several countries, expertise in 
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multiple fields and jurisdictions, and cross-disciplinary teams of advisors. This finding supports 
Decker and Lange’s (2016) claim that a global field of multi-family offices exists. Normative 
issues explain the similarity of their value propositions across national boundaries.  
Regarding the cognitive dimension, Table 1 shows that the coverage tends to be more benevolent 
in Period 1 and 2 than in later study periods, and it becomes more critical over time. The discussion 
of family offices in the final study period is more favorable in Germany (84%) than in Switzerland 
(80%), France (72%), and the UK (71%). Another difference is the source of the criticism. 
Newspaper articles criticize family offices either from a societal or a client perspective.  
The critique from a societal perspective was most pronounced in France. Unfavorable coverage 
focused on the scandal surrounding the Clymène family office and the close ties between the 
economic and political elite. Articles expressed the suspicion that these close ties had facilitated 
tax evasion on a large scale. Stevenot, Guery, Wood, and Brewster (2018) who report links 
between the state and finance in the related area of private equity, corroborate our findings. 
Switzerland also experienced a tax evasion scandal. However, the unfavorable coverage was more 
directed towards the accused individual than family offices in general, and the tax authorities 
doubted whether the organization under scrutiny was a family office. The scandal did not tarnish 
the reputation of family offices.  
From a client point of view, insufficient competence and conflicts of interest are the two sources 
of criticism. In the UK, the competence-based critique was dominant. Many family offices had 
been caught out by the financial crisis and did not react to it quickly and professionally. There was 
the view that the lack of effective corporate governance had exacerbated this problem. In Germany, 
a perceived conflict of interest between providers of family office services and their clients 
attracted more attention than in the UK. Deutsche Bank is a case in point. It tarnished the reputation 
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of bank-affiliated providers of family office services as it hurt the trust relations between these 
financial institutions and their clients.  
6.2 Contributions, limitations, and avenues for future research 
Overall, the findings support the view that “comparative cases are essential if we are to develop a 
better understanding of how and why we observe some outcomes, but not others, given similar 
contextual conditions” (Micelotta et al., 2017, p. 1905). We observe changes, especially in the 
regulative and cognitive dimensions, but the drivers of change differ across countries. Mainly 
external factors have triggered an institutional change in the UK and Switzerland; internal drivers 
have prevailed in France and Germany. 
Von Bloh et al. (2019) highlight the potential of media coverage for research in and across regions. 
Our study is one of the rare examples of examining variations in newspaper coverage across 
countries. Nonetheless, the main limitations that we see result from the chosen data. First, most 
family offices, especially small single-family offices, are secretive organizations that are reluctant 
to disclose their identities in the media. The family offices that are repeatedly covered tend to be 
large, globally operating multi-family offices that use the public interest to attract new clients 
(Decker & Lange, 2013). Thus, the data may be biased towards multi-family offices. Second, in 
line with the institutional tradition in media coverage research that views the media as “part of an 
institutional field of firm constituents for whom the media provide a stage for presenting their 
views on matters concerning a firm” (Graf-Vlachy et al., 2019, p. 9), this study adopts a macro 
view. A content analysis of articles does not reveal the microfoundations of institutional change, 
such as changes in the daily operations adopted by family offices to cope with changes in 
regulation. The dataset does not shed light on how the dynamics of the entrepreneurial families 
behind the family offices, such as their willingness to take advice (Strike, 2012), family members’ 
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actions and interactions with individuals inside and/or outside the family (Soleimanof et al., 2019), 
or generational involvement (Gray, 2005), affect the (non-) compliance with changes in 
institutions (Soleimanof et al., 2018). The combined analysis of media data and in depth-interviews 
(e.g., Decker & Günther, 2016) or ethnographic approaches (e.g., Glucksberg & Burrows, 2016) 
in future research could be revealing about microfoundations.  
Overall, we hope that our study guides promising future comparative research on the impact of 
institutional change on family offices.  
 33 
References 
Aguilera, R.V., & Jackson, G. (2003). The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: 
Dimensions and determinants. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 447-465.  
Ahlstrom, D., & Bruton, G.D. (2006). Venture capital in emerging economies: Networks and 
institutional change. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(2), 299-320.  
Ahlstrom, D., & Bruton, G.D. (2010). Rapid institutional shifts and the co-evolution of 
entrepreneurial firms in transition economies. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(3), 531-
554.  
Alden, C. (2005). Looking back on the crash. The Guardian, 10th March 2005. Available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2005/mar/10/newmedia.media (November 24, 2018). 
Beaverstock, J.V., Hall, S., & Wainwright, T. (2013). Servicing the super-rich: New financial elites 
and the rise of the private wealth management retail ecology. Regional Studies, 47(6), 834-849.  
Bork, D. (2006). Turkey. In F.W. Kaslow (Ed.), Handbook of Family Business and Family 
Business Consultation: A Global Perspective (pp. 293-317). Binghamton, NY: International 
Business Press. 
Carney, M. (2005). Corporate governance and competitive advantage in family-controlled firms. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29, 249-265.  
Carney, M., Gedajlovic, E., & Strike, V.M. (2014). Dead money: Inheritance law and the longevity 
of family firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 38, 1261-1283.  
Chua, J.H., Chrisman, J.J., Steier, L.P., & Rau, S.B. (2012). Sources of heterogeneity in family 
firms: An introduction. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 36(6), 1103-1113.  
Craig, J.B., & Moores, K. (2010). Championing family business issues to influence public policy: 
Evidence from Australia. Family Business Review, 23(2), 170-180.  
Decker, C., & Günther, C. (2016). Coordinating family entrepreneurship: When money seeks 
opportunity. International Journal of Entrepreneurial Venturing, 8, 46-61.  
Decker, C., & Lange, K. (2013). Exploring a secretive organization: What can we learn about 
family offices from the public sphere? Organizational Dynamics, 42(4), 298-306.  
Decker, C., & Lange, K. (2016). The global field of multi-family offices: An institutionalist 
perspective. Journal of Financial Services Marketing, 21, 64-75.  
Downs, A. (1972). Up and down with ecology: The issue-attention cycle. Public Interest, 28, 38-
50. 
Dunn, M.G. (1980). The family office as a coordinating mechanism within the ruling class. Critical 
Sociology, 9(2-3), 8-23.  
Duriau, V.J., Reger, R.K., & Pfarrer, M.D. (2007). A content analysis of the content analysis 
literature in organization studies. Research themes, data sources, and methodological refinements. 
Organizational Research Methods, 10, 5-34.  
Eesley, C., Li, J.B. & Yang, D. (2016). Does institutional change in universities influence high-
tech entrepreneurship? Evidence from China’s Project 985. Organization Science 27(2): 446-461.  
Eigenheer, R. (2014). New data on global differences in family offices. World Economics, 15(1), 
133-160.  
Geveke, K. (2018). Family offices as advisory bodies in Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland. 
An empirical survey of their structures, frameworks and aims. International Journal of Research 
in Business Studies and Management, 5(1), 11-18  
Gilding, M. (2005). Families and fortunes: Accumulation, management succession and inheritance 
in wealthy families. Journal of Sociology, 41, 29-45.  
 34 
Glucksberg, L., & Burrows, R. (2016). Family offices and the contemporary infrastructures of 
dynastic wealth. Sociologica, Italian Journal of Sociology on Line, 2/2016, DOI: 10.2383/85289.  
Graf-Vlachy, L., Oliver, A.G., Banfield, R., König, A., & Bundy, J. (2019). Media coverage of 
firms: Background, integration, and directions for future research. Journal of Management, in 
press. DOI: 10.1177/0149206319864155.  
Gray, L. (2005). How family dynamics influence the structure of the family office. Journal of 
Wealth Management, 8, 9-17.  
Hall, P.A., & Soskice, D. (2001). An introduction to varieties of capitalism. In P.A. Hall, & D. 
Soskice (Eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage 
(pp. 1-68). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Hall, P.A., & Thelen, K. (2008). Institutional change in varieties of capitalism. Socio-Economic 
Review, 7(1), 7-34.  
Harrington, B. (2016). Capital without Borders: Wealth Managers and the One Percent. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Hauser, B. (2001). The family office: Insight into their development in the U.S., a proposed 
prototype, and advice for adaptation in other countries. Journal of Wealth Management, 4(2): 9-
17.  
Hoffman, A.J. (1999). Institutional evolution and change: Environmentalism and the U.S. 
chemical industry. Academy of Management Journal, 42, 351-371.  
Hotho, J., & Saka-Helmhout, A. (2017). In and between societies: Reconnecting comparative 
institutionalism and organization theory. Organization Studies, 38(5), 647-666.  
Jaffe, D.T., & Lane, S.H. (2004). Sustaining a family dynasty: Key issues facing complex 
multigenerational business- and investment-owning families. Family Business Review, 17, 81-98.  
Jaskiewicz, P., Combs, J.G., & Rau, S.B. (2015). Entrepreneurial legacy: Toward a theory of how 
some family firms nurture transgenerational entrepreneurship. Journal of Business Venturing, 
30(1), 29-49.  
Jung, D.K., Aguilera, R., & Goyer, M. (2015). Institutions and preferences in settings of causal 
complexity: Foreign institutional investors and corporate restructuring practices in France. 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 26(16), 2062-2086.  
Kaslow, F.W. (2006). Brief History of the Family Firm Institute. In F.W. Kaslow (Ed.), Handbook 
of Family Business and Family Business Consultation: A Global Perspective, (pp. 3-24). 
Binghamton, NY: International Business Press. 
Kim, J.-H. (2006). Korea. In F.W. Kaslow (Ed.), Handbook of Family Business and Family 
Business Consultation: A Global Perspective (pp. 179-202). Binghamton, NY: International 
Business Press. 
Koning, M., Mertens, G., & Roosenboom, P. (2018). Drivers of institutional change around the 
world: The case of IFRS. Journal of International Business Studies, 49, 249-271.  
Korom, P., Lutter, M., & Beckert, J. (2017). The enduring importance of family wealth: Evidence 
from the Forbes 400, 1982 to 2013. Social Science Research, 65, 75-95.  
Lansberg, L., & Perrow, E. (1991). Understanding and working with leading family businesses in 
Latin America. Family Business Review, 5, 127-147.  
Leaptrott, J. (2005). An institutional theory view of the family business. Family Business Review, 
18(3), 215-228.  
Mann, A., & Nunes, T. (2009). After the dot-com bubble: Silicon Valley high-tech employment 
and wages in 2001 and 2008. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Regional Report, August 2009. 
 35 
Available at https://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/archive/after-the-dot-com-bubble-silicon-valley-high-
tech-employment-and-wages-in-2001-and-2008.pdf (November 24, 2018).  
Micelotta, E., Lounsbury, M., & Greenwood, R. (2017). Pathways of institutional change: An 
integrative review and research agenda. Journal of Management, 43(6), 1885-1910.  
Naldi, L., Chirico, F., Kellermanns, F., & Campopiano, G. (2015). All in the family? An 
exploratory study of family member advisors and firm performance. Family Business Review, 28, 
227-242.  
Norris, F. (2011). Crisis is over, but where is the fix? The New York Times, 11 March 2011: B1.  
Panico, M., Raithel, S., & Michel, E. (2014). The effect of media coverage on employer reputation. 
Journal of Media Economics, 27, 181-198.  
Parada, M.J., Nordqvist, M., & Gimeno, A. (2010). Institutionalizing the family business: The role 
of professional associations in fostering a change of values. Family Business Review, 23(4), 355-
372.  
Reay, T., Pearson, A., & Dyer, G. (2013). Advising family enterprise: Examining the role of family 
firm advisors. Family Business Review, 26, 209-214.  
Rosplock, K. (2014). The Complete Family Office Handbook. A Guide for Affluent Families and 
the Advisors Who Serve Them. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.  
Schickinger, A., Leitterstorf, M.P., & Kammerlander, N. (2018). Private equity and family firms: 
A systematic review and categorization of the field. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 9, 268-
292.  
Schneider, M., & Paunescu, M. (2012). Changing varieties of capitalism and revealed comparative 
advantages from 1990 to 2005: A test of the Hall and Soskice claims. Socio-Economic Review, 10, 
731-753.  
Scott, W.R. (2001). Institutions and Organizations. London: Sage. 
Seaman, C. (2015). Creating space for the business family. Networks, social capital & family 
businesses in rural development. Journal of Family Business Management, 5(2), 182-191.  
Soleimanof, S., Rutherford, M.W., & Webb, J.W. (2018). The intersection of family firms and 
institutional contexts: A review and agenda for future research. Family Business Review, 31, 32-
53.  
Soleimanof, S., Singh, K., & Holt, D.T. (2019). Micro-foundations of corporate entrepreneurship 
in family firms: An institution-based perspective. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 43(2), 
274-281.  
Stevenot, A., Guery, L. Wood, G., & Brewster, C. (2018). Country of origin effects and new 
financial actors: Private equity investment and work and employment practices of French firms. 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 56(4), 859-881.  
Stough, R., Welter, F., Block, J., Wennberg, K., & Basco, R. (2015). Family business and regional 
science: “Bridging the gap”. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 6, 208-218.  
Strike, V.M. (2012). Advising the family firm: Reviewing the past to build the future. Family 
Business Review, 25, 156-177.  
Strike, V.M. (2013). The most trusted advisor and the subtle advice process in family firms. Family 
Business Review, 26, 293-313.  
Strike, V.M., Michel, A., & Kammerlander, N. (2018). Unpacking the black box of family business 
advising: Insights from psychology. Family Business Review, 31(1), 80-124.  
Su, E. & Dou, J. (2013). How does knowledge sharing among advisors from different disciplines 
affect the quality of the services provided to the family business client? An investigation from the 
family business advisor’s perspective. Family Business Review, 26, 256-270.  
 36 
Suess, J. (2014). Family governance – Literature review and the development of a conceptual 
model. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 5, 138-155.  
Tempel, A., & Walgenbach, P. (2007). Global standardization of organizational forms and 
management practices? What New Institutionalism and the Business‐Systems approach can learn 
from each other. Journal of Management Studies, 44(1), 1-24.  
Vago, M. (2006). International expansion of family business consultation: Consulting in different 
countries. In F.W. Kaslow (Ed.), Handbook of Family Business and Family Business Consultation: 
A Global Perspective (pp. 25-44). Binghamton, NY: International Business Press. 
von Bloh, J., Broekel, T., Özgun, B., & Sternberg, R. (2019). New(s) data for entrepreneurship 
research? An innovative approach to use Big Data on media coverage. Small Business Economics, 
in press. DOI: 10.1007/s11187-019-00209-x.  
Welsh, D., Memili, E., Rosplock, K., & Segurado, J. (2013). Perceptions of entrepreneurship 
across generations in family offices: A stewardship theory. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 
4, 213-226.  
Welter, F. (2011). Contextualizing entrepreneurship – conceptual challenges and ways forward. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 35, 165-184.  
Wessel, S., Decker, C., Lange, K., & Hack, A. (2014). One size does not fit all: Entrepreneurial 
families’ reliance on family offices. European Management Journal, 32, 37-45.  
Whitley, R. (1999). Divergent Capitalisms : The Social Structuring and Change of Business 
Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Wonneberger, A., & Jacobs, S. (2017). Media positioning: Comparing organizations’ standing in 
the news. Corporate Communications: An International Journal, 22(3), 354-368.  
Wright, M., Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H., & Steier, L.P. (2014). Family enterprise and context. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 38(6), 1247-1260.  
Yunis, J.J. (2006). Chile. In F.W. Kaslow (Ed.), Handbook of Family Business and Family 
Business Consultation: A Global Perspective (pp. 151-164). Binghamton, NY: International 
Business Press. 
Zellweger, T., & Kammerlander, N. (2015). Family, wealth, and governance: An agency account. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 39(6), 1281-1303.  
